EFL quarterly : an E-Finance Lab publication ; 1/2010 by E-Finance Lab <Frankfurt, Main>
efl quarterly 01|
2010
AN E-FINANCE LAB PUBLICATION
The E-Finance Lab after Six Years of Success – 
Strategic Review and New Structure
The Verbal Side of Financial Data Analysis –
A Study on Machine Learning Capabilities 
How did Banks’ Problems spill 
over to the Real Sector? 
A preliminary Analysis 
The Financial Crisis –
Consequences for Online Banks
efl-Newsletter_07  13.01.2010  9:19 Uhr  Seite 1Impressum
Redaktion
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber
Dr.-Ing. Julian Eckert
Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Inform. Dieter Schuller 
Herausgeber
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Vorstandsvorsitzender des E-Finance Lab
Frankfurt am Main e. V.
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber 
Stellvertretender Vorstandsvorsitzender des E-Finance Lab
Frankfurt am Main e. V.
Kontakt
info@efinancelab.com 
www.efinancelab.com
Gestaltung  
Novensis Communication GmbH 
Bad Homburg
1. Ausgabe, 2010
Auflage 1.600 Stück
Copyright© by E-Finance Lab Frankfurt am Main e. V.
Printed in Germany
ISSN 1866-1238
efl-Newsletter_07  13.01.2010  9:19 Uhr  Seite 203 efinancelab | quarterly 01 | 2010
For more than a year, the E-Finance Lab has been a proud resident 
of the House of Finance (HoF) of Frankfurt’s Goethe University
(www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de) – an interdisciplinary institution comprising
150 researchers and 6 research and advanced teaching institutions in
finance (part of business administration), money & macroeconomics
(part of economics) and corporate & financial law, complemented by
expertise in information systems and technologies, and mathematics.
Both the HoF and the E-Finance Lab – the largest research institute
within the HoF – as well as our industry partners are affected by the
financial crisis and the questions on its roots and on the effectiveness
of measures taken or to be taken in its aftermath: Which lessons do
we have to learn from the financial crisis? How did information 
systems and electronic networks contribute and how can they be used
to overcome and to ease unwanted results of the crisis?
Against the background of both our integration into the HoF and the
new environment for the financial industry due to the crisis, together
with our industry partners, we decided after a strategic review to
replace the traditional five pillar structure of the E-Finance Lab by a
novel three stacked layer model (see figure) effective January 2010,
each layer being jointly led by two professors plus a junior professor.
Moreover, the overall research subject of the E-Finance Lab has been
adjusted to “The E-Finance Value Chain” – its optimization and inte-
gration.
The objective of the reorganization is fourfold: First, we better 
integrate the E-Finance Lab in itself. Second, we improve interfaces 
to research areas within the HoF, e.g. with respect to syste  mic risk
management or to customers in financial services institutions. Third,
we want to leverage our “unique selling proposition” relative to other
research institutes: the integration of research methodologies in
information systems research (the „E“) with methodologies in finance.
Fourth, we want to clearly and easily communicate the key focus
themes of our research: IT Infrastructure, Market Infrastructure and
Customers.
Editorial
The E-Finance Lab after Six Years of Success –
Strategic Review and New Structure
Peter Gomber Wolfgang König
The E-Finance 
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Information management is one of the most
challenging tasks for financial institutions. In
the last two decades, much progress has been
made in the development of quantitative models
and approaches. While much effort has been put
on the extensive analysis of quantitative data
such as historical price series, little intention has
been paid to the (automated) analysis of textual
data in the past, which undoubtedly represents a
large source of information in this context. 
Prior empirical research has shown that cer-
tain news stories such as corporate disclosures
can cause abnormal market behavior subse-
quent to their publication, which provides further
evidence that textual data represents a highly
relevant source of new information. On the basis
of a dataset that comprises corporate news sto-
ries and intraday stock prices, this article
explores how such textual data can be analyzed
with the help of machine learning techniques.
What is Machine Learning?
Machine learning techniques comprise a family
of methods that attempt to allow machines to
acquire knowledge for problem solving by show-
ing them historical cases. In a financial context,
such historical cases can, for instance, be a
sample of news publications that have been
mapped to stock price reactions observed on
the capital markets. Popular examples of
machine learning techniques represent
Decision Trees and Artificial Neural Networks,
which have already been successfully applied
since the 1960s and the 1980s, respectively.
The following Figure 1 illustrates how different
generations of machine learning techniques
have emerged in the last decades. Each of
these techniques has specific characteristics,
capabilities and shortcomings. These, for
example, entail different learning strategies,
dataset requirements and computing times.
Since textual data is highly unstructured, the
automated analysis represents a major chal-
lenge. Here, newer machine learning tech-
niques such as Support Vector Machines (SVM)
have revealed to be especially promising. In gen-
eral, these methods aim at forecasting if a cer-
tain example (e.g. a newly published news story)
belongs to one of two categories such as “rele-
vant” and “not relevant”. On the basis of given
training examples, the SVM builds a model that
for instance aims at predicting if a future news
story belongs to the “relevant” or the “not rele-
vant” group. What “relevant” and “not relevant”
exactly means can be defined by the analyst, who
might wish to evaluate whether a price reaction
will be “strong or weak” or “positive, neutral, or
negative” (Groth and Muntermann, 2009).
During the following analysis, we will exem-
plarily show the application of machine learn-
ing techniques in the financial domain. Hereby,
we aim to forecast whether or not the publica-
tion of a new corporate disclosure is followed
by extremely high abnormal volatility levels.
Textual Data Does Matter
Pursuing this attempt, our analysis is based on
corporate disclosures and corresponding firms’
intraday stock prices that were observed prior
and subsequent to the disclosures’ publication
dates. For different 15 minutes intervals, real-
ized volatilities were calculated in order to
explore whether or not such publications will
trigger significant capital market activities.
Furthermore, the volatility observed subse-
Research Report
The Verbal Side of Financial Data
Analysis – A Study on 
Machine Learning Capabilities 
AS A MATTER OF COURSE, QUANTITATIVE DATA SUCH AS TIME SERIES AND QUARTERLY FIGURES
ARE FREQUENTLY USED IN FINANCIAL ANALYSIS. SUCH DATA CAN BE PROCESSED AUTOMATI-
CALLY AND INTERPRETED RATHER EFFICIENTLY. HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF
RELEVANT INFORMATION ORIGINATES FROM UNSTRUCTURED SOURCES, PRIMARILY TEXTUAL
DATA, WHICH REQUIRE MANUAL (HUMAN) INTERPRETATION. WE EXPLORE EMPIRICALLY HOW
MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES CAN PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ANALYZING AND INTERPRETING
SUCH TEXTUAL DATA SOURCES.
Jan Muntermann Sven S. Groth
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Figure 1: Machine Learning Techniques
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sures is adjusted by volatility levels observed
during “normal” market phases. Consequently
the volatility increases shown in Figure 2 are
expected to be above zero during abnormal
market phases only. In financial management,
such volatility shocks attract much attention,
especially in risk management.
As we can also see in Figure 2, negligible
volatility increases can be observed for the
intervals prior to the publication dates of the
corporate disclosures. In contrast, significant
volatility increases follow their publication.
Over the course of time, the volatility adjusts to
a normal level. It may therefore be concluded
that the information contained in the corporate
disclosures may entail abnormal volatility levels.
“Learning Machines” that Read
Within our samples of corporate disclosures
there exist some that resulted in significantly
increased volatility, while others seem to
attract little attention only. Traditionally, an
analyst would manually review the disclosures
and assess their relevance. Given the corporate
disclosures and the calculated volatility
increases, we define a corresponding learning
task: Let a computer learn from historical data
with the goal to identify those disclosures that
resulted in the 25% highest volatility increases
during the first 15 minutes following the dis-
closures’ publication. In other words, based on
a disclosure’s content, automatically assign it
to either the class with expected extremely
high abnormal volatility levels or the class with
expected normal volatility levels. This task is
divided into two sub-phases. A learning phase
in which the computer develops a model from
provided observations and an application
phase in which the model is deployed. Here,
other observations are evaluated that were not
part of the learning dataset. We have used a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm in
order to learn a model that can be applied to
the textual corporate disclosures. In simple
words, the SVM aims to find two distinctive
areas in a multidimensional space, where each
word represents one of these dimensions and
where the two areas divide existing documents
into two different classes.
Forecasting Results
Our results provide evidence that the proposed
machine learning approach is capable to
detect patterns in the disclosure contents. We
applied different evaluation metrics to evaluate
how well the automated text analysis works.
One has to distinguish between how many
cases were identified correctly (precision) and
how many of all relevant disclosures were
identified (recall). Usually, a higher precision
can only be achieved by accepting a lower
recall and vice versa. In order to influence the
inherent trade-off, we additionally included
misclassification costs as a steering mecha-
nism. We were for example able to modify set-
tings in such a way that each corporate disclo-
sure that was assigned to the “extremely high
volatility class” actually belongs there (i.e.
100% precision). In this scenario, however,
merely 33.02% (recall) of all “extremely high
volatility”-entailing corporate disclosures were
grasped.
Conclusion
Latest machine learning techniques such as
Support Vector Machines represent promising
approaches to capitalize more efficiently on the
massive amounts of available textual data in
financial processes. Our empirical analyses
have shown that the applied algorithms were
able to detect patterns in the disclosure con-
tents and forecasting results were significantly
better than random guessing. The field of appli-
cation in the financial context is manifold (e.g.
Fung et al., 2005). One possible application field
could be algorithmic trading, where transac-
tions might be triggered based on analyzed tex-
tual data. This application can already be
observed in latest industry developments. With
regard to the observed volatility increases, mar-
ket monitoring tools may support the manage-
ment of intraday market risks.
References
Fung, G.P.C.; Yu, J.X.; Lu, H.:   
The Predicting Power of Textual Information on
Financial Markets, IEEE Intelligent Informatics
Bulletin, 5 (1) (2005). 
Groth, S.; Muntermann, J.:
Supporting Investment Management Proc-
esses with Machine Learning Techniques,
Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik,
Wien (2009).
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Figure 2: Volatility Shocks following News Publications
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If one follows the popular press and public
debates over the last two years, the impression
comes up that the emergence of the current
banking crisis is better understood than how
problems of the banking sector spread to the
macro-economy. Against this background, a
careful description of the operation mode and
necessity of the banking sector is provided, and
it will then be shown how stress in the banking
sector can spill over to the real sector.
The Key Mechanism: Costly external Finance
In a world where the renowned Modigliani
Miller theorems hold, a crisis like the current
one could hardly have emerged. The Modigliani
Miller theorems state that the business activi-
ties of a firm are independent of the firm’s
financial structure and its sources of financing.
Particularly, all sources of financing are equally
attractive and external financing (IPOs, sea-
soned offerings, bond placements and bank
loans) is considered costless, because the con-
ditions are ‘fair’. In such a world, banks are not
very important for corporate finance, and all
profitable investment projects are carried out.
However, research over the last half century
presented evidence of the existence of a so
called pecking order of financing. “Pecking
order” simply means that companies consider
internal funds cheaper than external financing.
External finance is costly and firms are some-
times unwilling to raise external funds, even
when these funds could alternatively be used
for profitable investment projects. Companies
particularly dislike issuing equity. Explaining
the reasons for the pecking order is beyond the
scope of this article, but they are generally
assumed to be driven by asymmetric informa-
tion. Information is asymmetric in the sense
that the management of a firm, acting in the
interest of current shareholders, possesses
superior information about risk, value and
quality of the company and its investment
prospects compared to potential external
investors. One way to overcome asymmetric
information is to produce information. Producing
information includes conducting interviews
with company representatives, collecting data,
visiting factories and analyzing sector informa-
tion. But information production is costly and is
often only conducted when a long term rela-
tionship to the borrower exists or is being
established, so that information produced once
can be used for several consecutive loans. If a
corporate uses a close long-term relation to a
bank, it might pay off for the bank to acquire
extensive information about the corporate and
to grant loans that banks without such infor-
mation would not be willing to grant. If this so
called relationship lender suffers from a short-
age of capital and reduces lending, a corporate
could be rejected a loan and could therefore be
forced to forego a beneficial expenditure.
Lending from the relationship lender cannot
easily be substituted by other sources of
financing, because the relationship lender has
proprietary information about the prospective
borrower. 
The Effects of the Subprime Crisis on Banks
Causes of the problems that banks had in the 
last two and a half years have been well
explained and well understood, e.g. tremen-
dous capital shocks on the asset side followed
by run-like problems on the liability side of the
How did Banks’ Problems spill over to
the Real Sector? A preliminary Analysis 
THE PRESENT ARTICLE TRIES TO DEMYSTIFY THE LINK BETWEEN THE SUBPRIME BANKING
CRISIS AND THE SUBSEQUENT FALL IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. AN UP-TO-DATE REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE ON THE REAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS OF BANK LENDING CAPACITY
IS PROVIDED, PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF A DECLINE IN NEW BANK LOANS ALONG WITH 
EVIDENCE OF CORPORATE REACTIONS TO THIS DECLINE. FINALLY, IT IS SHOWN HOW THE 
PRESENTED FACTS CAN ADD UP TO AN EVENT OF MACROECONOMIC DIMENSION.  
Jens Kruk
Research Report
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Figure 1: Changes of financial leverage of banks in times of declining asset values (Adrian and Shin, 2008).
The graph shows procyclical leverage.
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balance sheet (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009).
The most important consequence of these
events is that banks lost a lot of capital and had
difficulties in raising necessary funds. However,
the details of the problems of banks shall not
be subject of this article.
It will be taken as given that bank capital was in
very short supply and the financial condition of
banks was largely opaque to potential external
investors. Banks, due to the reasons explained
above, were unwilling to raise equity. And since
banks need a certain amount of bank capital to
comply with regulatory rules, they cannot simply
replace equity by debt. A situation in which
banks are rationing credit because they are
short of capital is often called a credit crunch.
Conse  quentially, not all corporates can refer to
their relationship lender to fund investments.
Such firms can react by using other sources of
financing, which is problematic for the reasons
mentioned above, or by reducing expenditures.
There are two strands of evidence for the pre-
sented idea of a credit crunch caused by a loss
of bank capital. Evidence of a reduction in bank
lending and reactions of the corporate sector
will be described. 
Bank Lending during the Crisis
The literature recognizes three reasons for the
decline in bank lending capacity since the begin-
ning of the crisis in 2007. First, assets held by
banks suffered from severe price reductions,
causing massive writedowns by banks. Second,
in times of financial instability, certain banks
usually deleverage. Figure 1 shows that in
recent episodes of financial instability, leverage
was reduced strongly (Adrian and Shin, 2008). A
reduction of leverage with rigid capital results in
a reduction of assets. Third, before the financial
crisis, many banks held assets via off-balance-
sheet entities such as conduits. Typically, banks
provided liquidity or credit enhancement for
their conduits and received the spread between
the return on the assets held by the conduit
and the interest on the asset-backed commer-
cial paper issued by the conduit. The provision of
liquidity or credit enhancement de facto means
that the sponsoring bank insures the asset-
backed commercial paper investors against
credit risk and other risks of a conduit. One
advantage of conduits over direct holding of the
respective assets from a bank’s perspective is
the lower capital requirement of off-balance-
sheet asset holding through conduits. After
investor confidence eroded and conduits were
no longer able to roll over asset-backed com-
mercial paper, many banks took the assets of
the conduits back on their own balance sheets
or conduits tapped credit lines from their spon-
soring banks (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009). This
bound already scarce bank capital. None of the
three developments described above would
have been a problem if banks had been willing
to raise sufficient external equity. However,
banks seemingly were unwilling to do so. The
alternative was to reduce assets, which normal-
ly implies a reduction of loans. The problem was
magnified by the enormous leverage of US
banks at the onset of the crisis, so any Dollar of
lost or additionally bound capital resulted in
many Dollars of asset reduction if the Dollar
was not raised as external equity. Researchers
extrapolated losses of USD 250 billion of US
banks, which seems to be a rather modest
amount in the review, to a total contraction of
lending to the real sector of around USD one
trillion (Greenlaw et al., 2008). Further calcula-
tions suggest that such a contraction of lending
could be responsible for a substantial contrac-
tion of gross domestic product (Greenlaw et al.,
2008). In addition, figure 2 documents a sub-
stantial decrease in new bank lending of US
banks in September to November 2008 com-
pared to the peak period in 2007 (Ivashina and
Scharfstein, 2009). 
Evidence from the real Sector
The analysis of bank lending will now be sup-
plemented by an investigation of borrower
behavior. First, firms which suffered particu-
larly after the onset of the crisis are funda-
mentally different from firms which suffered
most from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Tong
and Wei, 2008). Firms, which suffered particu-
larly in the four weeks following 9/11 (labeled
‘Sensitivity’ in figure 3), are assumed to depend
strongly on consumer confidence, because the
9/11 terrorist attacks raised concerns about
the future economic development and political
stability, while difficulties in getting credit did
not play a role during this period. Furthermore,
Tong and Wei identify firms which were charac-
terized by difficulties to obtain credit before the
crisis began (labeled ‘Constraint’ in figure 3).
Then, they compare the stock price develop-
ment of these two groups after 9/11 and after
August 9
th 2007, when a serious escalation of
the banking crisis occurred. While after 9/11,
stocks of firms, that depend on consumer con-
fidence, declined more than stocks of credit
constrained firms, the opposite was observed
following August 9
th 2007 (see figure 3). This is
evidence for the view that difficulties in obtaining
Figure 2: Development of new bank loans (in USD billions) during the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2009).
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economic decline. 
Second, firms which had little cash in mid 2006
reduced investment from the period mid-2006 –
mid-2007 to mid-2007 – mid-2008 more than
otherwise comparable firms with more cash
(Duchin et al., 2009). This difference could not
be detected in normal times when credit was
easily available. The explanation is that in normal
times, firms, which have little cash, are financing
their investments externally with loans and
therefore show investment behavior similar to
otherwise identical cash rich firms. In times of
a credit crunch, credit is difficult to obtain and
firms with little cash have to cut their invest-
ments. Third, otherwise similar firms, which only
differ in terms of the maturity of their debt,
exhibited different investment behavior in the
crisis, while such a difference could not be dis-
covered in normal times (Almeida et al., 2009).
Firms, with debt maturing right at the onset of
the current crisis, reduced investment by 2.5
percent more than otherwise similar firms with
a longer duration until debt maturity. The inter-
pretation is straightforward: when banks cut
lending, firms depending on lending are hurt a
lot more than firms with sufficient internal funds.
So some firms’ debt is not rolled over in times
of a credit crunch and these firms react by a
reduction of investment. The fourth type of evi-
dence comes from a global survey of CFOs of
large companies. Firms with CFOs who reported
to be credit constrained reduced capital spending,
employment and planned R&D expenditures
substantially more than comparable firms with
CFOs who reported not to be credit constrained
(Campello et al., 2009). Furthermore, such firms
used existing cash and drew credit lines to make
up for their difficulties in obtaining external
finance. In addition, credit constrained firms far
more often reported to forego profitable invest-
ment projects. 
The presented evidence from exploring bank and
corporate data suggests that corporate invest-
ment is important in explaining the downturn in
gross domestic product. Indeed, macroeconom-
ic statistics show aggregate investment was
reduced by about 4 percent in the US between
mid-2007 and mid-2008, a number that is con-
sistent with the micro evidence presented above.
Conclusion
The analysis at hand explains how frictions in
the corporate financing process can result in a
credit crunch. In a world without financial fric-
tions (where the Modigliani Miller theorems
hold), it seems implausible that macroeconomic
stress could originate in the banking sector. 
Layer II of the E-Finance Lab is currently inves-
tigating how the relationship to a particular bank
influenced the development of a firm during the
crisis.
The analysis is preliminary and much more
research will discuss the current crisis. How-
ever, the key mechanism explained in this arti-
cle will certainly play a prominent role in fur-
ther discussions. 
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Figure 3: Effect of the subprime crisis on stock prices of firms that are credit constrained (‘Constraint’) or that
depend on consumer confidence (‘Sensitivity’) (Tong and Wei, 2008)
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The crisis left many clients underinvested due
to continuing uncertainty in securities mar-
kets and extremely low interest rates in
money markets. Could you please first of all
illustrate what has changed for DAB bank as
an online bank/broker during and in the
aftermath of the financial crisis? 
Investors are still very cautious following the
financial crisis. Since autumn 2008, turnover
figures of German exchanges indicate investors’
reluctance to place securities transactions,
which is also reflected in our customers’
behavior.
Since our credit business is limited to margin
loans, we are having a high debit carryover on
hand. Investing those funds in a safe and sus-
tainable manner has been a real challenge
throughout the financial crisis.
But we mastered that challenge: a strong and
independent product range, a balanced portfo-
lio strategy within our treasury portfolio, and
strict cost discipline lead to profitability in 2009
with earnings before taxes of 26.5m EUR
already after 9 months.
Has the clients’ demand for investment advice
increased?
It definitely has. Typical customers of online
banks can be classified as “self-directors” who
look after their financial investments in a self-
determined manner. For this customer base,
we offer a broad set of information services
and market-leading trading applications.
At the same time, one can also take notice 
of customers’ growing demand for an “invest-
ments sparring partner” and for fair and inde-
pendent advice. As a direct bank, we cover a
wide range of investment advice: Either via
telephone through our Private Banking Team
or face-to-face through Asset Managers with
whom we liaise closely in our B2B business.
What is the impact of new regulatory guide-
lines on the process of providing investment
advice?
Online banks can respond to regulatory
changes with clever solutions. For instance, 
we developed a process to communicate coun-
seling minutes immediately after the interview.
Subsequent to the counseling session, these
minutes are sent to the customer via email,
who is then able to confirm them through a
personalized URL.
What is the impact of the crisis on the com-
petitive playing field between direct banks/
online brokers and bricks-and-mortar banks?
The financial crisis revealed to many clients
that they had previously been badly advised, for
instance in cases where customers’ portfolios
at bricks-and-mortar banks mainly held in-
house products. Direct banks like DAB bank, 
in contrast, are better able to position their
product range independently.
A recent study exposed that five million cus-
tomers of bricks-and-mortar banks are cur-
rently thinking of switching to a direct bank. 
We assume that the financial crisis will rein-
force this trend. It will also be amplified by the
growing number of online users in Germany
and the increasing price sensitivity of bank
customers.
Is “independent advice” in B2C business a
model for the future and what is the impact
on B2B relations?
It is our goal to offer every customer type
appropriate investment advice and support
depending on financial know-how, portfolio
volume and investment horizon. This may
include advice via telephone by B2C-personnel
or on-site support by independent financial
advisors. These approaches are not meant to
compete, but rather to complement and to
strengthen one another.
As you can see, online banks offer a broad
range of products, which make them well pre-
pared for the future.
Thank you for this interesting conversation. 
Insideview
Dr. Markus Walch 
Member of the Board
DAB bank AG
The Financial Crisis –
Consequences for Online Banks
INTERVIEW WITH DR. MARKUS WALCH, DAB BANK
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New EFL Tier-2 partner
We are pleased to announce that as of January 2010, a new Tier-2 partner has joined the E-Finance Lab:
360 Treasury Systems AG (360T) owns and maintains advanced trading technologies for foreign
exchange and money market instruments capable of trading in streaming-price and quote-request
mode. Furthermore, the company offers a professional white label trading technology for internal
electronic trading services on a proprietary branded platform. Clients are multinational corporate
treasuries, asset managers, hedge funds, broker/dealers and buy-side banks. Founded in 2000 and
headquartered in Frankfurt, 360T maintains subsidiaries in New York and Singapore. Welcome to
the E-Finance Lab!
Awards and dissertations
E-Finance Lab researchers Prof. Roman Beck and Robert Gregory, together with Oliver Marschollek,
were awarded the best paper award at the 4
th Pre-ICIS International Research Workshop on IT
Project Management (www.sigitprojmgmt.org) in Phoenix, USA. With their research, they show how
boundary spanning mechanisms help to bridge the diverging interests of different stakeholders in
IT projects. Congratulations!
Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Ing. Julian Eckert (Layer I) has received his doctoral degree on October 6
th, 2009, with
a dissertation on “Cross-organizational Service-based Workflows – Solution Strategies for Quality
of Service Optimization”. Congratulations!
On November 19
th, 2009, Eva Gerstmeier (former researcher at the E-Finance Lab) successfully
defended her Ph.D. thesis “Interactive Pricing Mechanisms”. In particular, she analyzed in her thesis
how financial service providers should react to the wider popularity of those pricing mechanisms,
which are nowadays frequently used for pricing online advertisements. In 2008, a proposal for this
thesis was awarded with the prize of the Horizont foundation. Congratulations!
E-Finance Lab Spring Conference 2010 “The New Financial Markets Infrastructure – Trading and
Clearing”, February 23
rd, 2010.
The E-Finance Lab Spring Conference 2010 will be held at the Westend Campus of the Goethe-
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http://www.efinancelab.de/events/conferences/fruehjahrstagung-2010/
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Recent challenges in the banking industry force banks to renovate their core banking systems in
order to survive competition. Thus, a progressive renovation approach is preferable to total replace-
ment strategies because it is less intrusive and less risky. 
This paper presents an incremental core banking renovation methodology based on the concept of
business entities. The methodology is implemented in order to develop a SOA solution for dynamic
product bundling for an Asian bank. The corresponding renovation project provided an opportunity
to explore SOA design principles regarding service component modularity, service reusability,
change management and integration, and also to empirically demonstrate the advantages of the
business entity-centric approach in achieving well-designed SOA solutions.
Liu, R.; Wu, F.; Patnaik, Y.; Kumaran, S.
In: IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC) 2009. pp. 466–473.
Infopool
RESEARCH PAPER: BUSINESS ENTITIES: A SOA APPROACH
TO PROGRESSIVE CORE BANKING RENOVATION
The E-Finance Lab conducts two kinds of newsletters which both appear 
quarterly so that each six weeks the audience is supplied by new research
results and information about research in progress. The focus of the printed
newsletter is the description of two research results on a managerial 
level – complemented by an editorial, an interview, and some short news.
For subscription, please send an e-mail to eflquarterly@efinancelab.com
or mail your business card with the note “please printed newsletter” to
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber  
Vice Chairman of the E-Finance Lab
Goethe University
Grüneburgplatz 1 
60323 Frankfurt
The Internet-type newsletter uses short teaser texts complemented by 
hyperlinks to further information resources in the Internet. To subscribe,
please send an e-mail to
newsletter@efinancelab.com.
Further information about the E-Finance Lab is available at 
www.efinancelab.com.
Electronic newsletter
The authors investigate cross-buying across loyalty program partnerships. Their results suggest that
customer usage of – and satisfaction with – the core service influences customer cross-buying from
loyalty program partners. The cross-buying behavior then reinforces the customer’s relationship with
the core service, as cross-buying positively influences future purchases of the core service. If the
objective of a loyalty program is to increase the customer’s usage of the bank’s core products and
services, they should choose loyalty program partners that offer a good fit with the core product or
service. Furthermore, marketing strategies that seek to increase customer satisfaction may pay off
twice – once for the direct effect on core service usage and once for the indirect effect through cross-
buying. This double pay-off increases the return on customer satisfaction or service quality. As a con-
sequence, financial service providers that have set up a loyalty program with many good-fitting part-
ners may be better able to amortize high investments in service quality through the returns, not only
from repurchases but also from cross-buying from their partners.
Lemon, K. N.; v. Wangenheim, F.
In: Journal of Service Research 11 (2009) 4, pp. 357–370.
RESEARCH PAPER: THE REINFORCING EFFECTS OF LOYALTY
PROGRAM PARTNERSHIPS AND CORE SERVICE USAGE
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The E-Finance Lab is a proud member of the House of Finance of Goethe University, Frankfurt. 
For more information about the House of Finance, please visit www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de.
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